The Senate chamber cannot legally serve as refuge for a senator facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant — a point that gained sharp relevance after Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa was placed under so-called “Senate protective custody” Monday following a chase through the building by National Bureau of Investigation agents.
Former Far Eastern University Institute of Law Dean Mel Sta. Maria laid out ten legal grounds for why this position holds, arguing that the Senate building’s ownership status alone eliminates any claim of sanctuary. Because it is either rented at public expense or government-owned and therefore belonging to the people, no legislation designates it as protected ground for those facing criminal charges. “There is no law expressly making the premises of the senate a safe haven for fugitives or those charged with the commission of a crime,” Sta. Maria wrote.
The constitutional immunity that senators enjoy from arrest applies only within a narrow set of conditions — when the Senate is actively in session and only for offenses punishable by fewer than six years of imprisonment. Crimes against humanity involving death fall far outside that threshold. Under Republic Act No. 9851, the Philippine law on international humanitarian law, such offenses carry a penalty of reclusion perpetua, which Sta. Maria cited as 40 years.
The same law, he noted, explicitly authorizes the Philippines to allow an international tribunal to investigate or prosecute individuals already being tried before it and, when necessary, to surrender such persons. This authority, under Section 17 of RA 9851, aligns with the broader principle under international law that crimes against humanity are universal in character — a principle the Philippine Constitution incorporates as part of domestic law.
On the validity of the ICC arrest warrant itself, Sta. Maria argued that the Bill of Rights does not limit judicial authority to Philippine courts. The constitutional requirement that no person be arrested without a warrant issued by a judge does not specify a domestic judge, meaning the provision can extend to a foreign judge whose jurisdiction the Philippines has accepted.
Sta. Maria also addressed the Senate’s act of granting custody, framing it as a separation-of-powers issue. Crimes against humanity carry an inherent international dimension, placing enforcement squarely within executive functions — including foreign policy, public order, and the apprehension of fugitives. Legislative interference in those functions, he argued, would itself violate the constitutional division of government powers.
The NBI, he added, acted within its authority in pursuing dela Rosa, and there is a legal presumption that government enforcement actions are carried out regularly. The concept of “Senate protective custody” — absent any law establishing it as an exemption to a valid arrest warrant — has no legal basis, Sta. Maria said.
“Unless stopped by the Supreme Court, the enforcement of a valid arrest must proceed. No one is above the law,” he wrote.
Dela Rosa has since filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking to block any enforcement action against him, with his lawyers arguing that an ICC warrant alone — without a warrant issued by a Philippine judge upon an independent finding of probable cause — does not meet the constitutional standard for a lawful arrest.
